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Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform) 
 
Benjamin H. Barton1 
 
This Article argues that the pursuit of a civil Gideon (a civil guarantee of 
counsel to match Gideon v. Wainright’s guarantee of appointed criminal 
counsel) is an error logistically and jurisprudentially and advocates an 
alternate route for ameliorating the execrable state of pro se litigation for the 
poor in this country: pro se court reform.    
 
Gideon itself has largely proven a disappointment.  Between overworked and 
underfunded lawyers and a loose standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
the system has been degraded.  As each player becomes anesthetized to cutting 
corners a system designed as a square becomes a circle. 
 
There is little in indigent criminal defense that makes one think that a 
guarantee of civil counsel will work very well.  If Courts have not required 
funding for meaningful representation in the serious cases covered in Gideon 
(including felony and death penalty prosecutions), it is extremely unlikely that 
they would do so in civil cases like eviction or deportation.   
 
Moreover, focusing our attention on pro se court reform is a much, much more 
promising and likely palliative to the legal problems of the poor.  Lastly, and 
most importantly, civil Gideon is a deeply conservative and backward looking 
solution to this problem, while pro se court reform has the potential to do more 
than just help the poor.  It has the potential to radically reshape our justice 
system in ways that assist everyone. 
 
 
 “Civil Gideon” is a short hand name for a concept that has been the white 
whale of American poverty law for the last 40 years – a constitutional civil 
guarantee to a lawyer to match the criminal guarantee from Gideon v. Wainright.2  
                                                        
1  Director of Clinical Programs and Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of 
Law.  B.A. 1991, Haverford College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan.  The author gives special thanks 
to Indya Kincannon, Alex Long, Mae Quinn, Doug Blaze, Charles Wolfram, Jeff Hirsch, Jennifer 
Hendricks, Brannon Denning, Glenn Reynolds, the participants of the 2009 SEALS Conference and the 
Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz. 
2  Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) guaranteed a right to appointed counsel in felony 
cases in state prosecutions by applying the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to the states under 
the due process clause.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) created the Sixth Amendment right to 
a lawyer in federal felony cases.  Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) extended the right to 
counsel from Gideon and Zerbst to misdemeanors if the defendant was to face any time in jail.  
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This Article argues that the pursuit of civil Gideon is an error logistically and 
jurisprudentially and advocates an alternate route for ameliorating the execrable 
state of pro se litigation for the poor in this country: pro se court reform.3  
This Article and the civil Gideon advocates agree on one key point.  The 
current treatment of persons too poor to afford counsel in America’s civil courts is 
an embarrassment and a serious and growing problem.  Despite this common 
ground, three key difficulties led to this Article.  First, Gideon itself has largely 
proven a disappointment.  Between overworked and underfunded lawyers and a 
loose standard for ineffective assistance of counsel there is little in indigent criminal 
defense that makes one think that a guarantee of civil counsel will work very well.  
Second, focusing our attention on pro se court reform is a much, much more 
promising and likely palliative to the legal problems of the poor.   
Lastly, and most importantly, civil Gideon is a deeply conservative and 
backward looking solution to this problem, while pro se court reform has the 
potential to do more than just help the poor.  It has the potential to radically reshape 
our justice system in ways that assist everyone.  At the end of this Article I describe 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Note that the civil Gideon movement actually encompasses reform efforts through both legislation 
and litigation.  See The Legal Intelligencer Blog, Civil Gideon Movement Looks to Expand Right to 
Publicly Provided Legal Counsel, http://thelegalintelligencer.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/civil-
gideon-movement-looks-to-expand-right-to-publicly-provided-legal-counsel/ (last visited October 
15, 2009).  This article focuses its critique on a court-ordered civil Gideon.  For reasons that will 
become clear, legislative civil Gideon is also inferior to pro se court reform, but is less problematic 
than court-mandated change, because at least it would be a result of the legislative process rather 
than court-ordered.  
3 When this Article refers to “pro se court reform,” that phrase means a rethinking and overhaul of 
courts that feature a regularized majority (or plurality) of pro se matters.  Depending on the 
jurisdiction and demographics, common pro se courts include specialty courts that handle child 
support, child custody, domestic abuse/protective orders, landlord-tenant courts, small claims courts 
and divorce courts. See Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality 
and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, 
Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423 n.1 (2004) (listing statistics on 
some majority pro se courts). 
 3 
a science fiction thought experiment: imagine a world where the courts that deal 
with the poor are so simple, efficient, transparent and pleasant that for once the 
justice system of the poor was the envy of the rich.  Pro se court reform actually 
offers this possibility.   
If civil Gideon were merely a mildly bad idea, the division among poverty 
lawyers and community advocates on this issue would be of limited import.4  The 
fact that civil Gideon is a bad idea and saps energy and resources from a better, more 
workable solution, however, necessitates an effort to convince others to join the pro 
se court reform movement.5 
Nevertheless, bar associations, academics and poverty lawyers are working 
harder on civil Gideon than ever.  In 2006, the ABA House of Delegates unanimously 
approved a report calling for a national civil Gideon to “provide legal counsel as a 
matter of right at public expense to low income persons in those categories of 
                                                        
4  Poverty advocates fall into three general categories.  Many poverty advocates are focusing the bulk 
of their energy on civil Gideon, see, e.g. law review symposia cited in note __; National Coalition for a 
Civil Right to Counsel, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/ (last visited December 11, 2009); 
Brennan Center for Justice, Civil Right to Counsel, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/civil_right_to_counsel (last visited 
December 11, 2009).  Others basically advocate for both approaches, see, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 7-10, 14-16 (2004).  For example Russell Engler has written advocating for both 
civil Gideon and pro se court reform.  See Russell Engler, Shaping A Context-Based Civil Gideon from the 
Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697 (2006) (advocating for civil Gideon); 
Russell Engler, And Justice for All--Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, 
Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999)(advocating pro se court reform).  Often pro se 
assistance or court reform are treated as stopgap measures.  See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Having One 
Oar or Being Without a Boat: Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations an Limited Legal 
Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617 (1999).  Lastly, some have advocated solely for pro se court 
reform.  See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access To Lawyers 
Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 
970 (2004).  This is the first Article to comprehensively contrast the strengths and weaknesses of 
both approaches. 
5  On a personal note, I may seem a somewhat unusual opponent to civil Gideon, as I have spent the 
bulk of my legal career teaching law school clinic students and representing the indigent, both as 
appointed criminal counsel and offering free civil legal services.  Nevertheless, the longer I do this 
work the more strongly I feel that civil Gideon is not the answer. 
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adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those 
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody.”6  There has likewise 
been an uptick of favorable scholarly attention, including at least four recent law 
review symposia pushing for civil Gideon.7  Public interest lawyers have filed recent 
cases and formed civil Gideon working groups.8  
 Three caveats before the argument begins in earnest.  First, while this Article 
is quite critical of civil Gideon, no disrespect whatsoever is meant to its many 
proponents.  As a general rule any focus on the problems of the poor is welcome and 
the civil Gideon supporters have their hearts in the right place.  Second, part of the 
argument is a comparison between the lofty rhetoric and great promise of Gideon 
and the sad reality of our current system of indigent defense.  This Article does not 
argue that Gideon itself is wrong or should be overturned; rather the focus is on the 
deeply flawed implementation, not Gideon itself.9  Last, this article includes some 
rather distressing facts, figures and anecdotes concerning public defenders and 
appointed counsel for the indigent.  There are many, many excellent criminal 
defense lawyers representing the poor all over the country and I have had the 
                                                        
6  American Bar Association, Civil Gideon Resolution, 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf (last visited December 11, 
2009). 
7  Symposium, Civil Gideon in New York, 25 TUORO L. REV. 1 (2009); Symposium, A Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases: Civil Gideon in Maryland & Beyond, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2007); Symposium, Edward V. 
Sparer Symposium Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006); CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY LAW & POLICY, (July-Aug. 2006) 
(dedicating entire issue to “civil Gideon” efforts). 
8  For example, a consortium of lawyers led by the Public Justice Center filed a recent case in 
Maryland arguing for a civil Gideon right.  See Public Justice Center, Civil Gideon, 
http://www.publicjustice.org/current-focus-
area/index.cfm?subpageid=36&gclid=CNHml4PxzZwCFRqdnAod6hPHLA.  For a broader umbrella 
organization, see National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/.  
9  This article does argue, however, that every extension of Gideon weakens the original case and 
leads inevitably to disintegration of a great case’s promise. 
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pleasure of meeting and working with some of them over my career, so nothing 
stated herein should be seen as an indictment of all criminal defense lawyers or 
public defenders.   
It is fair to indict the system as a whole, however.  System-wide the view is 
beyond disturbing.  It is bad enough that any civil Gideon advocate should think 
twice before importing a broken criminal system into our civil courts.  As written, 
Gideon is an iconic case that makes an important statement about the nature of the 
criminal process in the United States.  Yet as applied Gideon has hardly guaranteed 
equal access to the courts for the poor.  To the contrary, two factors have made 
Gideon’s promise illusory indeed: the reticence of courts to set funding levels or 
limit caseloads for Gideon’s guaranteed counsel and the galling laxity of the Court’s 
definition of the ineffective assistance of counsel.10   
In fact, there is an argument to be made that Gideon has worked out great for 
everyone in the system except criminal defendants.  The legal profession won 
because a massive new source of guaranteed business was opened.11  Judges won 
because lawyers, in comparison to pro se litigants, make every judge’s job easier.12  
                                                        
10  As a general rule courts have declined to order set funding levels for indigent defense or to cap 
case loads.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, Raising the Roof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 85, 88-89 (2007).  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) is the case that set the current 
lax standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Strickland is discussed at length infra notes __ and 
accompanying text. 
11  The big prize was actually the guarantee of misdemeanor counsel in Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25 (1972), because many states already guaranteed counsel in felony cases at the time of Gideon.  See 
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 144-48 (1964) (noting that 22 states joined an amicus brief in favor 
of appointing counsel in felony cases).  By contrast, neither the federal government nor the vast 
majority of states provided counsel for misdemeanor prosecutions that might result in jail time.  See 
infra note __.  Argesinger itself actually includes a lengthy discussion of the additional lawyers that 
would be needed to staff its new guarantee of counsel.  Argesinger, 407 U.S. at 37 n. 7 and 39. 
12  This statement of Judge Robert Sweet in favor of civil Gideon is typical: “every trial judge knows . . . 
the task of determining the correct legal outcome is rendered almost impossible without effective 
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Society wins because everyone gets to feel better about guaranteeing defendants a 
lawyer.  The psychological value of Gideon – that everyone can rest easy knowing 
that lawyers are theoretically ensuring that the system works for rich and poor alike 
– should not be underestimated.13  The double bonus is that system-wide the 
lawyers are so underpaid and overburdened that in most jurisdictions they are 
unable to put up much of a fight, so society gets the appearance of fairness without a 
high rate of acquittals or actual trials.   
Moreover, Strickland v. Washington set the standards for ineffective 
assistance of counsel so low14 that sleeping lawyers have been found effective.15  So 
while Gideon guarantees a robust right to counsel, Strickland and its progeny have 
powerfully diluted the content of that guarantee. 
  If civil Gideon became a reality it is extremely unlikely that civil lawyers 
would be better supported.  Courts would likely not require limits on caseloads or 
increased expenditures on a guaranteed right to civil counsel.  Nor would civil 
plaintiffs be guaranteed a competent lawyer with time to investigate, research and 
try their cases.  To the contrary, if the absolutely critical rights theoretically 
protected by Gideon can be so watered down, a civil Gideon would likely fare much 
                                                                                                                                                                     
counsel.”  Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503, 
505 (1998). 
13  Judges also share this psychological salve.  Any judge who regularly hears criminal trials is aware 
that the system has some serious flaws.  Nevertheless, the appearance of a lawyer on each side of the 
case allows the judge to sit as a neutral arbiter rather than a culpable participant. 
14  In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, the Supreme Court created a two-part test for determining 
ineffective assistance of counsel: the defendant must demonstrate (1) that counsel's performance fell 
below the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner, and (2) that the defendant was 
prejudiced by that sub-standard performance.  The holes in this standard are discussed in greater 
detail infra notes ___ and accompanying text.  
15  For example, a Texas Appellate Court held that a sleeping lawyer’s naps might have been a 
“strategic move” because “the jury might have sympathy for appellant because of” the naps. 
McFarland v. State, 928 S.W. 2d 482, 506 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
 7 
worse.16  The government’s long-term treatment (read starvation) of civil legal aid 
societies also does not make civil Gideon look particularly promising.17  
 Court ordered Civil Gideon is also very unlikely to occur.  The Supreme 
Court chose not to extend Gideon to termination of parental rights cases in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services of Durham County.18  This was a brutal defeat for civil 
Gideon, because a termination of parental rights case presents the closest possible 
civil analogy to Gideon that does not involve imprisonment: it dealt with a liberty 
interest (the right to keep one’s children) that the Court has repeatedly credited as 
powerful, as well as coercive state action, the State of North Carolina itself sought to 
take the Mother’s children.  No state or federal court since has recognized a broad 
civil right to counsel since the loss in Lassiter.19  Moreover, the current fiscal 
situation makes this an awkward time to ask a court to guarantee an expensive new 
constitutional right.20  
 There are serious jurisprudential concerns to extending Gideon.  Among the 
cases that made up the due process revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s Gideon 
                                                        
16  Some of the worst stories of the betrayal of Gideon’s promise come from death penalty defenses.  
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for 
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).  If courts and legislatures have been disinterested 
in ensuring that capital defenders are well funded and trained, how will landlord/tenant defense 
fare? 
17  Funding for legal aid services has been drastically cut over the past two decades. See SUSAN R. 
MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 70-71 (2004). 
18 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
19  See Jason Boblick, A Consumer Protection Act?: Infringement of the Consumer Debtor's Due Process 
Rights Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
713, 735 & n. 167 (2008).  There have beensporadic, quite limited applications, see Martha F. Davis, 
In the Interests of Justice: Human Rights and the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 25 TOURO L. REV. 147, 
154 (2009), but nothing like the broad, national right that civil Gideon advocates are hoping for. 
20  Financial pressures also make a legislatively provided civil Gideon unlikely.  Nevertheless, 
California recently passed a limited civil Gideon right in their state courts. See Tamara Audi, ‘Civil 
Gideon’ Trumpets Legal Discord, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125659997034609181.html (last 
visited January 2, 2010). 
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and its progeny were among the more aggressive “living constitution” cases.  As a 
historical matter neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment 
were meant to provide a government paid lawyer to criminal defendants.21  The 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that a criminal defendant shall “have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense”22 only guaranteed the right to hire a lawyer, not the right to 
have the government pay for a lawyer.23  Likewise, given the extreme rarity of 
appointed counsel and the trend towards deprofessionalizing the legal profession at 
the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,24 it is highly unlikely that the 
Due Process Clause was meant to guarantee appointed counsel.25 
 Nonetheless, Gideon is a little bit like Brown v. Board of Education.26  It may 
not have been consistent with the original understanding of the Constitution, but it 
is hard to argue in retrospect that it was not absolutely the right decision.  Gideon 
certainly struck a chord when it held that “reason and reflection require us to 
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel 
is provided for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”27  Nevertheless, every 
new extension of Gideon takes it a step beyond the point where it is “an obvious 
truth” that constitutional fairness requires a new guarantee of counsel and runs the 
risk of replacing legislative funding priorities with those of judges.  Extending the 
                                                        
21  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
22  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
23  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
24  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
25  Note that since the early-20th century the Due Process Clause has generally been read to reflect a 
contemporary analysis of “fundamental fairness” rather than any original intent.  See infra notes __ 
and accompanying text. 
26  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
27  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
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right to counsel too far could threaten the legitimacy of Gideon itself.  In fact, some 
recent commentators have argued that the best way to protect and enforce Gideon is 
to roll back its extension to misdemeanor cases in Argesinger v. Hamlin.28  The 
broadening of Gideon to include misdemeanors, juvenile cases and other less serious 
types of offenses alone may have led to Gideon’s destruction.  Courts may have 
defended a right limited to felonies more jealously or at least recognized that more 
and better legal work was necessary on such serious cases.   
There are also particular reasons to be concerned in an area where judges 
are requiring the appointment of lawyers.  Is it necessarily true that the answer to 
the problems of the poor is more lawyers or more due process?  Stated flatly, there 
are many reasons for advocates for the poor to worry when courts or bar 
associations announce an intention to assist the poor.  The implementation of 
Gideon alone should offer a hint as to how these things work out in the long run.  In 
Gideon, and other due process cases, the Court has often followed up high-minded 
rhetoric with a shameful lack of substance.29  At a certain point courts are no longer 
to blame and advocates for the poor must take some responsibility.  Like Charlie 
Brown trying to kick Lucy’s football, it may be time to try a different game. 
 Lastly, there is a cheaper, less constitutionally troubling and more likely 
solution: an overhaul of the courts that handle the bulk of the nation’s pro se matters 
would go a long way towards reaching the aims of civil Gideon.  As it stands now 
most courts are not set up to cope with a substantial pro se docket.  Clerks are 
                                                        
28  Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007). 
29  For a fuller discussion, see infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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instructed not to give “legal advice” to pro se litigants.30  In many courts no one 
explains to pro se litigants what papers need to be filed, what needs to be argued in 
court or even how the process is supposed to operate.31  In many courts judges do 
not consider it their responsibility to ameliorate any of this.32  Often very little effort 
has been made to streamline or simplify either the law or the procedure in the 
courts where much unrepresented poverty work occurs.33 
 If a systematic effort were made to simplify the law and procedure in courts 
with large pro se dockets it could improve outcomes in those courts and do more for 
the poor than a guarantee of counsel, all at less cost.  Too often access to justice only 
means access to lawyers.34  Rather than seeing the plight of the poor as an 
opportunity to fund more lawyers, we should see it as an opportunity to make 
American law simpler, fairer and more affordable.  If courts with substantial pro se 
dockets were actually able to reform, the justice system for the poor would, for once, 
be the envy of the rich.  
This fact alone (that better pro se courts would expose how unnecessary 
lawyers are in many cases) helps explain why pro se reform has been so slow to 
occur and why it may actually be no more likely than civil Gideon.  For example, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court has spearheaded a statewide effort to address the 
                                                        
30 Russell Engler, And Justice for All – Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the 
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987-88 (1999). 
31  Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
641, 653 (2006) (noting that “a majority of surveyed courts have no formal pro se assistance 
services”). 
32  Cf. ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 172 (1999) (spending only three 
paragraphs of an entire book about the process of judging on dealing with pro se litigants). 
33  See RHODE, supra note __ at 14-16. 
34  Cf. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 
399 (2004) (“The bar's debates about access to justice have traditionally assumed that the main 
problem is inadequate access to lawyers and that the solution is to make their services more broadly 
available.”). 
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hideous problems poor Tennesseans who cannot afford counsel face when seeking a 
divorce.35  Many of the more aggressive reforms were dead on arrival – the divorce 
bar was not going to stand for any changes that threatened their grip on middle and 
upper class divorces.36  Nevertheless, the flood of pro se cases in some courts is such 
that reform is happening all over the country somewhat under the radar.  A unified 
push by poverty lawyers and other advocates could transform these courts and in 
the process the lives of the many of the poor. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I lays out the Supreme Court case law 
on free, appointed counsel from Gideon to Lassiter.  Part II discusses the status of 
civil Gideon efforts post-Lassiter.  Part III argues that extending Gideon to civil cases 
presents a number of logistical and constitutional concerns.  Part IV concludes that 
there is a batter way to address the needs of the poor – a comprehensive effort to 
reform those courts that have a large pro se docket. 
I. From Gideon to Lassiter 
 In a series of famous 1960s cases the Warren Court launched a due process 
revolution in criminal procedure, guaranteeing a series of new rights to criminal 
defendants.  Gideon v. Wainright was among the earliest of these cases and it 
remains one of the most enduring and influential. 
 A.  Pre-Gideon 
                                                        
35  See Letter from Carl Pierce, Chairman, Tennessee Supreme Court Task Force on the Study of Self-  
Represented Litigant Issues in Tennessee, to Marcy Easton, President, Tennessee Bar Association 
(July 30, 2007), http://www.tba.org/tbatoday/news/2007/prosedivorce_letter_090707.pdf 
36  Email from Carl Pierce (September 12, 2009, 14:24 EST) (on file with author). 
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 The journey to Gideon began in 1932 with Powell v. Alabama.37  Powell was a 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process case, not a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
case.38  Powell dealt with the trial of nine black defendants accused (with very little 
supporting evidence) of raping two white women on a train passing through 
Alabama.  The trial was an obvious sham.  It was held only days after the alleged 
crime before an all white jury.  The defendants were not allowed to choose their 
counsel and the trial court appointed two attorneys on the eve of trial, with no time 
or incentive to investigate or prepare a defense.39 
 The Supreme Court concluded that the “defendants were not accorded the 
right of counsel in any substantial sense.”40  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court faced 
two substantial barriers to overturning the case.  First, the Alabama Constitution 
stated a right to assistance of counsel, an Alabama Statute required appointed 
counsel in capital cases and the court had actually appointed lawyers to represent 
the defendants.41  So the case involved more than just a right to counsel.  Because 
counsel was actually appointed Powell required a finding of a right to competent 
counsel. 
   Second, the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the States at the time and it 
was unclear whether the Fourteenth Amendment could guarantee a right to counsel 
in state courts at all.  This was especially so in light of Hurtado v. California,42 which 
refused to require a grand jury indictment in the States under the Due Process 
                                                        
37  Powell, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
38  Id. at 71. 
39  DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2d ed. 1979) 11-20. 
40  Powell, 287 U.S. at 58. 
41  Id. at 59-60. 
42  Hurtado, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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Clause because “if it had been the purpose of [the Fourteenth] Amendment to 
perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in the states, it would have embodied, as 
did the Fifth Amendment, an express declaration to that effect.”43  This reasoning 
obviously applied to the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel as well. 
 The Court avoided these problems in two ways.  First, it mounted a 
passionate defense of the critical role of effective criminal defense counsel: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If 
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that 
be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and 
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or 
federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed 
by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a 
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the 
constitutional sense.44 
 
Second, despite the far reaching logical ramifications of the above language the 
Court limited its holding quite narrowly to the facts at issue:  appointment of 
effective counsel is required “in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to 
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of 
ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like.”45  
                                                        
43  Powell, 287 U.S. at 66. 
44  Id. at 68-69. 
45  Id. at 71. 
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 Six years after Powell the Court held for the first time that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel guaranteed appointed counsel in federal courts in 
Johnson v. Zerbst.46  The Court quoted at length from the language above and noted 
the Sixth Amendment “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the 
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the 
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.”47  As a result, after 
1938 criminal defendants in the federal system had a right to appointed counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment.   
 In 1942 the Court turned to the application of the Sixth Amendment in state 
courts in Betts v. Brady48 and held that the “Sixth Amendment of the national 
Constitution applies only to trials in federal courts.”49  The Court did allow that the 
denial of an appointed lawyer in state court could “constitute a denial of 
fundamental fairness” on a case-by-case basis, depending on “the totality of the 
facts.”50 
 The Court went through an exhaustive history of the right to counsel in the 
colonies and states from before the American Revolution up to the current practice 
in 1942.  The Court noted that in the 18th and 19th centuries the appointment of 
counsel had been covered, if at all, as a statutory matter in the states, not 
                                                        
46  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
47  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63. 
48 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
49  Betts, 316 U.S. at 461. 
50  Id. at 462. 
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constitutionally and that “the contemporary legislation” on appointment of counsel 
“exhibits great diversity of policy.”51  The Court then concluded: 
This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the states, it has 
been the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their 
courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a 
fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has generally been deemed one of 
legislative policy. In the light of this evidence we are unable to say that the 
concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates 
the states, whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such 
case.52 
 
 B. Gideon 
Twenty-three years later in Gideon v. Wainright53 the Court overruled Betts in 
felony cases and incorporated the Sixth Amendment into the Due Process Clause.54  
Gideon listed the main precedents that had guaranteed a right to counsel in federal 
courts – Zerbst and Powell v. Alabama – as support for its decision and argued that 
Betts had been an “abrupt break” with these precedents.55  Nevertheless, Gideon’s 
own discussion of Betts recognized that Betts was based upon “the constitutional, 
legislative, and judicial history of the states to the present date,”56 and even 
commentators who agree with Gideon’s holding have noted that Betts more 
accurately described the history of the appointment of counsel in criminal cases.57 
                                                        
51  Id. at 467-69 & n. 20. 
52  Id. at 471-72. 
53  Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
54  Id. at 344-45. 
55  Id. at 344. 
56  Id. at 340. 
57  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, On the Origin of Rules (With Apologies to Darwin): A Comment on Antonin 
Scalia’s The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 997, 1008-09 (2008) (“None of the pre-
Betts cases, fairly read, really suggested an across-the-board rule requiring states to appoint counsel 
in all felony cases.”). 
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The heart of the opinion comes not from precedent, but from the Court’s 
eloquent defense of the need for counsel as an irreplaceable aspect of the 
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause:  
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to 
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious truth. 
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of 
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.  Lawyers 
to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest 
in an orderly society.  Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, 
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and 
present their defenses.  That government hires lawyers to prosecute and 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest 
indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries.  The right of one charged with crime to counsel may 
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but 
it is in ours.  From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions 
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every 
defendant stands equal before the law.  This noble ideal cannot be realized if 
the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to 
assist him.58  
 
This language, and Gideon’s holding, was promising to criminal defense and poverty 
lawyers on a number of levels.  First, it stated a very muscular interest in the 
fairness of court proceedings for indigent litigants.  Second, it overruled a relatively 
recent precedent.  Third, it did so despite the fact that Betts was basically correct on 
the lack of a longstanding right to appointed counsel at common law or in the 
states.59  Lastly, the long, florid section quoted above includes no supporting 
citations, an unusual move for the Court.  The willingness to use “reason and 
reflection” in this manner suggested that the Court would now scrutinize the 
                                                        
58  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.  The Court followed this language with a long quote of “the moving words 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama” quoted supra note and accompanying text. 
59 See supra notes __ and accompanying text. 
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criminal justice system much more closely, even if it meant discarding controlling 
precedent. 
 C. Post-Gideon 
 The language and holding of Gideon had obvious implications for civil cases 
and calls for Gideon’s application to unrepresented indigent litigants in civil cases 
began almost immediately.  For example, in Sandoval v. Rattikin an indigent Texas 
litigant argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required appointment of counsel in 
a property dispute (technically a trespass-to-try-title action).60  The Texas appellate 
court disagreed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.61  Likewise, a 1967 Yale 
Law Journal Note argued for “The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases.”62   
 While no court openly embraced a right to appointed civil counsel during this 
period, Gideon itself was extended in a series of cases that offered hope.  In the cases 
described below the Court extended Gideon beyond felonies to misdemeanors and 
to quasi-criminal cases that were not strictly Sixth Amendment criminal cases.   
 In Argesinger v. Hamlin the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel applied beyond felonies to any misdemeanor prosecution that 
resulted in jail time, regardless of how short that sentence might be.63  Since the 
liberty interests involved in some civil cases (notably deportation or termination of 
                                                        
60  Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 
(1966). 
61  Sandoval, 395 S.W.2d at 893-94. 
62  Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).  Other similar works 
include Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966); Note, The 
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 989 (1975); Note, The Emerging Right of 
Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 554 (1976); Comment, 
Current Prospects for an Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel and Free Transcript in Civil Litigation, 7 
PAC. L.J. 149 (1976). 
63  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
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parental rights cases) were arguably at least as strong (and possibly stronger), 
Argesinger seemed a natural step towards civil Gideon. 
 Likewise, a series of non-Sixth Amendment cases stretched Gideon in ways 
that suggested that a civil right to counsel might fit.  In re Gault extended Gideon to 
juvenile proceedings, even though juvenile proceedings were not strictly criminal in 
nature.64  Gault held that the nature of the right at stake – the juvenile defendant's 
liberty itself – was the key question in determining a right to appointed counsel 
under a due process analysis, rather than whether a Sixth Amendment right was 
implicated.65  
 Taken together Gault and Argesinger seemed quite helpful to civil Gideon.  
Gault made clear that the due process driven right to counsel extended beyond Sixth 
Amendment cases and that the critical question was the nature of the right at stake.  
Argesinger set a relatively low bar for the seriousness needed: even the threat of a 
day in jail was sufficient to trigger a constitutional requirement for appointed 
counsel. 
 The subsequent cases were more of a mixed bag; none squarely foreclosed or 
required civil Gideon.  The 1980 case of Vitek v. Jones extended the right to counsel 
to prisoners who were being involuntarily transferred from prison to a state mental 
hospital.66  Vitek held that prisoners have a due process right not to be transferred 
without a hearing and an appointed lawyer despite the fact that the transfer hearing 
was civil and not criminal in nature, based on the liberty interest at stake and the 
                                                        
64 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1967) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings if 
confinement is possible). 
65  Gault, 387 U.S. at 39-42. 
66  Vitak v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
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potential stigma of being found mentally ill.67  Note that Vitek is another case where 
the liberty interest was not confinement: when the transferred prisoner’s sentence 
was finished a civil commitment proceeding was necessary to hold him longer in the 
mental hospital.68 
 The Court also refused to extend Gideon in several cases before Lassiter.  
Notably, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli and Morrissey v. Brewer the Court held that while 
counsel might be required in some proceedings to revoke parole or find a violation 
of probation, counsel was not uniformly necessary in those types of cases.69  This 
holding basically applied the case-by-case analysis that had been the law between 
Betts and Gideon to this new area.70  The Court declined to extend Gideon to these 
proceedings because parolees and probationers have a lessened liberty interest and 
revocation of probation or parole cases are generally less formal and often do not 
involve a lawyer on the government’s side.71  Nevertheless, Gagnon and Morrissey 
sat uneasily with In re Gault and Argesinger because all of the cases involved 
potential imprisonment as the liberty interest, but in the parole and probation cases 
                                                        
67  Id. at 487-88. 
68  Id. at 483-84.  It is true, however, that the type of confinement was changed. 
69  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-91 (1973) (holding that counsel need not be provided in all 
probation revocation hearings, but should be in appropriate cases); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 489 (1972) (not reaching the question of whether counsel must be provided in parole 
revocation hearings).  Later courts applied Gagnon’s holding on counsel to the Morrissey situation, 
settling that question in both revocation of parole and violation of probation cases.  See Lassiter, 452 
U.S. at 26. 
70  See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788-89 (“In so concluding, we are of course aware that the case-by-case 
approach to the right to counsel in felony prosecutions adopted in Betts v. Brady, was later rejected in 
favor of a per se rule in Gideon v. Wainwright.”). 
71  See id. at 786-88. 
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no lawyer was required.  The Court also refused to extend Argesinger and Gideon to 
misdemeanor prosecutions that did not result in imprisonment in Scott v. Illinois.72  
 The pre-Lassiter cases were thus a bit of a mess.  It was certainly clear that 
the right to appointed counsel stretched beyond the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of counsel in criminal cases because Gault and Vitek extended the right to civil 
proceedings.  There were a series of cases that seemed to suggest that the key 
protected liberty interest was freedom from imprisonment, no matter how short the 
imprisonment: Gault and Argesinger appointed counsel because of potential 
imprisonment and Scott v. Illinois denied counsel where imprisonment was not at 
issue.   
 Vitek, Gagnon, and Morrissey, however, undercut grouping the cases 
according to a threat of imprisonment: Gagnon v. Scarpelli and Morrissey v. Brewer 
involved the threat of imprisonment (and revocation hearings often involve much 
longer prison terms than misdemeanor prosecutions)73 and refused automatic 
appointment of counsel, while Vitek allowed appointment despite the fact that no 
additional imprisonment was at issue (although serving the time in a mental 
hospital was certainly a different type of imprisonment).  Thus, while there were 
cases that suggested that imprisonment was the key distinction, other cases 
                                                        
72  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that the “central premise of Argersinger” was 
“that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of 
imprisonment”).  There were two more pre-Lassiter cases that refused to extend Gideon.  In Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975), the Court refused to extend Gideon to school disciplinary hearings, 
because those proceedings are brief, informal, and educational in nature.  In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 
584, 604-609 (1979) the Court refused to extend Gideon to voluntary commitment proceedings 
involving a minor because of the parent’s role as well as the medical and informal nature of those 
proceedings. 
73  Cf. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 472-73 (the two petitioners faced as much as 6 or 7 additional years of 
imprisonment upon their parole revocation, whereas Argesinger protects misdemeanor defendants 
who face any threat of imprisonment, even a day). 
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suggested that courts should weigh the import of the liberty interest at stake and 
then decide whether fundamental fairness required appointment of a lawyer. 
D. Lassiter 
 With these cases in mind, the Court turned to the possibility of civil Gideon in 
the 1982 case of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County.74  
Lassiter dealt with the state of North Carolina’s termination of parental rights case 
against Abby Gail Lassiter.75 
In many ways Lassiter was an optimal civil Gideon case.  Outside of 
imprisonment, the right to parent one’s children is perhaps the strongest 
constitutional liberty interest.  Lassiter itself stated the interest in quite stringent 
terms: 
This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple 
citation that a parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, 
custody and management of his or her children is an important interest that 
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing 
interest, protection.  Here the State has sought not simply to infringe upon 
that interest but to end it.  If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique 
kind of deprivation.  A parent's interest in the accuracy and injustice of the 
decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore a commanding 
one.76 
 
Termination of parental rights involves the government itself permanently 
terminating the parental relationship in a formal legal proceeding.  Thus, Lassiter 
presented a legal structure almost identical to Gideon: the State sought to deprive 
the petitioner of a critical liberty interest in a formal proceeding brought by the 
state’s lawyers.  If there was going to be a type of civil case where, like Gideon, it 
                                                        
74  452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
75  Id. at 20-22. 
76  Id. at 27 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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would be an “obvious truth” that the petitioner could not “be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for [her],” this was it.  In this regard, the petitioners in 
Lassiter had a strong argument that termination of parental rights proceedings were 
akin to the juvenile proceedings in Gault or the transfer proceedings in Vitek.  
Termination proceedings were not criminal proceedings, but the liberty deprivation 
was so great that a quasi-criminal level of protection was appropriate.77 
Nevertheless, Lassiter is one of those cases where a brief read through the 
facts makes the decision itself anti-climactic.  The majority opinion includes an 
embarrassing plethora of details (many of which are clearly irrelevant to the legal 
issue at hand) to make it clear to any reader that Abby Lassiter was not a fit parent 
for her son and that an appointed lawyer would have made no difference 
whatsoever.78   
The facts attempt to demonstrate that Abby Lassiter was a terribly unfit 
mother and a dangerous criminal.  Abby Lassiter’s infant son William came to the 
attention of the Department of Social Services (“DSS”) because of a complaint from 
Duke Pediatrics that Ms. Lassiter had not followed up with the pediatric clinic for 
her son’s medical problems and that “they were having difficulty in locating Ms. 
Lassiter.”79  In response to that complaint, a social worker took William from Ms. 
Lassiter’s care and brought him to the hospital herself.  William was then admitted 
and treated for “breathing difficulties [and] malnutrition and [because] there was a 
                                                        
77  Cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Where an individual's liberty interest 
assumes sufficiently weighty constitutional significance, and the State by a formal and adversarial 
proceeding seeks to curtail that interest, the right to counsel may be necessary to ensure 
fundamental fairness.”). 
78  All of the facts in the next few paragraphs come from Lassiter itself.  Id. at 22-28. 
79  Id. at 22. 
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great deal of scarring that indicated that he had a severe infection that had gone 
untreated.”80  In late-spring 1975, a Durham County District Court found that Ms. 
Lassiter had not provided William with proper medical care, adjudicated him a 
neglected child and transferred him to the custody of the Department of Social 
Services.    
The Court goes on to paint Ms. Lassiter as almost aggressively disinterested 
in her child, noting that “except for one ‘prearranged’ visit and a chance meeting on 
the street, Ms. Lassiter had not seen William after he had come into the State's 
custody, and that neither Ms. Lassiter nor her mother had ‘made any contact with 
the Department of Social Services regarding that child.’”81  The Court also states that 
Ms. Lassiter did not contest or even attend the hearing originally removing William 
from her custody. 
Of course, the Court explains that Ms. Lassiter might have been busy during 
this period, since she and her mother were accused of First Degree murder in the 
Spring of 1976.  The details of Ms. Lassiter’s criminal charges are clearly not 
relevant to her due process rights in a termination of parental rights proceeding, but 
in footnote one in the very first paragraph of the opinion the Court gratuitously 
includes a lurid description of the crime from a decision in Ms. Lassiter’s criminal 
appeal: 
Defendant's mother told [the deceased] to ‘come on.’  They began to struggle 
and deceased fell or was knocked to the floor.  Defendant's mother was 
beating deceased with a broom.  While deceased was still on the floor and 
being beaten with the broom, defendant entered the apartment.  She went 
into the kitchen and got a butcher knife.  She took the knife and began 
                                                        
80  Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81  Id. at 22. 
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stabbing the deceased who was still prostrate.  The body of deceased had 
seven stab wounds.  State v. Lassiter, No. 7614SC1054 (June 1, 1977).82 
 
Ms. Lassiter was sentenced to 25-40 years of imprisonment. 
 The Court’s version of the facts also establishes that not only did Ms. Lassiter 
fail to request a lawyer’s assistance in the termination proceedings; she was 
positively disinterested in the proceedings.  According to the Court, Ms. Lassiter’s 
mother paid to have a lawyer for her criminal appeal, but Ms. Lassiter did not 
mention the termination to that lawyer or hire another lawyer.83  Moreover, she was 
brought to the termination hearing at “the behest of the Department of Social 
Services' attorney.”84  At that hearing the issue of appointed legal representation 
was raised “at the judge’s insistence,” rather than by Ms. Lassiter.85  The trial court 
concluded that Ms. Lassiter “had ample opportunity to seek and obtain counsel prior 
to the hearing of this matter, and [that] her failure to do so is without just cause.”86  
Later, the Court held that in “deciding whether due process requires the 
appointment of counsel” a reviewing court “need not ignore a parent's plain 
demonstration” of disinterest in such proceedings, specifically referencing that “Ms. 
Lassiter had not even bothered to speak to her retained lawyer after being notified 
                                                        
82  Id. at 20 n. 1. 
83  Id. at 21-22.  The Court notes that Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination proceedings “to 
any other person except, she said, to ‘someone’ in the prison.”  The details in this sentence alone well 
establish the Court’s disdain for Ms. Lassiter.  It is not enough to point out that Ms. Lassiter failed to 
talk to anyone about the proceedings except “someone” at the prison, the Court adds the “she said” to 
suggest that even that contact should be doubted as an unsubstantiated falsehood.  
84  Id. at 21. 
85  Id. at 21-22. 
86  Id. at 21-22. 
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of the termination hearing.”87  The words “had not even bothered” nicely capture 
the Court’s feelings on Ms. Lassiter’s case.  
 Last, the Court presents a number of facts that devastate Ms. Lassiter’s main 
argument against termination of parental rights: that her mother (William’s 
grandmother) should be given custody.  The Court stated that the grandmother had 
actually reported Ms. Lassiter to DSS.  The Court quoted testimony establishing that 
the grandmother had indicated “on a number of occasions that she was not able to 
take responsibility for the child” and that “people in the community and from [the 
grandmother]'s church” also felt that she could not handle the responsibility and 
that William “has not seen his grandmother since [a] chance meeting in July of '76 
and that was the only time.”88  
 Worst of all, the Court makes much of the grandmother’s role in the murder 
that led to Ms. Lassiter’s incarceration.  The Court includes the fact that the 
grandmother was also indicted for first degree murder.89  The Court points out that 
Ms. Lassiter’s post-conviction challenge of her murder trial was partially based upon 
a claim that the grandmother actually committed the crime and had said “And I did 
it, I hope she dies.”90  Nor does the Court let these facts pass without comment.  
During the due process analysis the Court openly mocks Ms. Lassiter’s custody 
argument: “Ms. Lassiter's argument here that her mother should have been given 
                                                        
87  Id. at 33. 
88  Id. at 21-22. 
89  Id. at 20 n. 1. 
90  Id. 
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custody of William is hardly consistent with her argument in the collateral attack on 
her murder conviction that she was innocent because her mother was guilty.”91  
So, in sum, the Court’s description of the case involved a convicted murderer 
and her accomplice seeking custody of a child neither of them had seen or shown 
any interest in for years.  After reading these facts it is obvious that there was 
virtually no chance that the Supreme Court would require a retrial of this case with 
a lawyer.  Their description of the case leaves the reader with only one question: 
what took the State so long?  
Nevertheless, to deny Ms. Lassiter’s appeal the Court still needed to place this 
case within its post-Gideon precedents.  As noted above, this was not going to be 
easy.  Lassiter chose to draw a bright line at imprisonment: “The pre-eminent 
generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents on an indigent's right to 
appointed counsel is that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the 
litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.”92  The Court 
distinguished Gagnon and Morissey by noting that parolees and probationers only 
have a “conditional liberty” interest and “as a litigant's interest in personal liberty 
diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel.”93 
 With this generalization in mind, the Court created a “presumption that an 
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be 
deprived of his physical liberty.”94  This presumption serves as a weight “against . . . 
                                                        
91  Id. at 33 n. 8. 
92  Id. at 25. 
93  Id. at 26. 
94  Id. at 26-27. 
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all the other elements in the due process decision.”95  The creation of such a 
presumption basically doomed Ms. Lassiter’s appeal and has stood as a powerful 
barrier to any recognition of a civil Gideon ever since. 
The “other elements in the due process decision” are the three part test from 
Mathews v. Eldridge: “[1] the private interests at stake, [2] the government's 
interest, and [3] the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous 
decisions.”96  A court “must balance these elements against each other, and then set 
their net weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to 
appointed counsel only where the indigent . . . may lose his personal freedom.”97  
The Court then applied the test to the termination of parental rights.  On the 
first prong, the Court found that a parent has a very strong interest in maintaining 
their parental rights.98  On the second prong, the State shares the parental interest 
in what is best for the child and the importance of an accurate decision.  The State’s 
interests diverge from the parent’s, however, because it wants to proceed “as 
economically as possible” and “wants to avoid both the expense of appointed 
counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may cause.”99  On 
the last prong the Court listed the various procedural protections provided beyond 
the appointment of a lawyer (written notice, a hearing, etc.), but also considered the 
possibility of a complicated termination case involving expert or medical 
testimony.100 
                                                        
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
97  Id. at 27.  
98  Id. at 27. 
99  Id. at 28. 
100  Id. at 28-31. 
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When the Court turned to balancing these factors, the actual circumstances of 
Ms. Lassiter led inevitably to a finding that on balance a lawyer was not necessary in 
her case and therefore not necessary in every termination of parental rights case.  
The case involved no particularly complicated law or facts.  No experts testified.  Ms. 
Lassiter had a chance to present her case and cross-examine witnesses.101  
Moreover, the Court used the many unfortunate facts outlined above against the 
concept of civil Gideon.  Ms. Lassiter was serving a lengthy prison sentence and 
obviously not fit to care for her son.  According to her own post-conviction 
arguments, Ms. Lassiter’s mother was likely an accomplice.  She had also repeatedly 
said she did not want the child.102  Neither Ms. Lassiter nor her mother had shown 
any interest in the child.  Nor had Ms. Lassiter shown much interest in even 
attending the proceeding.103  In a contest where “fundamental fairness” was at issue 
the Court stacked the deck strongly against Ms. Lassiter and civil Gideon. 
The denial of appointed counsel in termination of parental rights 
proceedings basically signaled the death knell for civil Gideon on a going forward 
basis.104  If the presumption against appointed counsel in non-imprisonment cases 
is strong enough to defeat a due process claim dealing with the state taking a 
citizen’s children, it is hard to imagine a different scenario where appointment 
would be required.  This is especially so where the Court admitted that the 
“potential costs of appointed counsel in termination proceedings” is “de minimis 
                                                        
101  Id. at 32-33. 
102  Id. at 33 & n. 8. 
103  Id. at 31-33. 
104  See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel For Indigent Parents: 
The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 
367-72 (2005).  
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compared to the costs [of appointment] in all criminal actions,”105 and still refused 
to require appointed counsel in each case.106 
II. Post-Lassiter Civil Gideon 
 Based upon Lassiter one would expect civil Gideon to hibernate for a time and 
this was indeed the case.  From Lassiter until the mid-90s little happened on the civil 
Gideon front.107  Interestingly it was a judge who helped relaunch civil Gideon.  On 
December 2, 1997, Federal District Court Judge Robert Sweet gave a speech in favor 
of what he termed a “civil Gideon.”  The speech was reprinted in the Yale Law and 
Policy Review.108   
From this article forward there has been a tremendous rekindling of interest 
in civil Gideon.  For example, just since 2006 there have been three civil Gideon law 
review symposium issues.109  Likewise, the ABA110 and multiple state bar 
                                                        
105  Id. at 28. 
106  On this score, compare Gideon, where the practice of most states in appointing felony counsel was 
critical to the Court’s decision, Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345, with Lassiter, which uses the fact that 33 states 
appoint counsel in Ms. Lassiter’s circumstances as support for the fairness of its decision.  Lassiter, 
452 U.S. at 34. 
107  See Martha F. Davis, In the Interests of Justice: Human Rights and the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 
25 TOURO L. REV. 147, 153-54 (“Until recently, the Lassiter decision had a chilling effect on domestic 
litigation and advocacy supporting a right to counsel in civil cases.”). 
108 Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503, 503 
(1998).  A Westlaw search in the JLR database for the term “civil Gideon” finds 140 articles, with only 
three mentions pre-dating Sweet’s article.  In fact, from this search it appears that from Lassiter until 
1997 only one law review article was written about civil Gideon.  See Earl F. Johnson, Jr., The Right to 
Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (1985). 
109  Symposium, Civil Gideon in New York, 25 TUORO L. REV. 1 (2009); Symposium, A Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases: Civil Gideon in Maryland & Beyond, 37 U. Balt. L. Rev. 1 (2007); Symposium, Edward V. 
Sparer Symposium Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006); CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY LAW & POLICY, (July-Aug. 2006) 
(dedicating entire issue to “civil Gideon” laws).  There was also a recent civil Gideon conference co-
sponsored by the ABA and the Massachusetts Bar Association.  See Kelsey Sadoff, Civil Gideon 
Symposium Mobilizes Legal Community Behind Equal Justice in Law, LAWYERS JOURNAL, Nov. 2007, 
available at  http://www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/publications/lawyers-
journal/2007/november/civil-gideon-symposium-mobilizes-legal-community-behind-equal-justice-
in-law (last visited June 29, 2009).  
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associations have declared support for the concept.111  There are a number of 
national and local groups advocating for civil Gideon in courts and legislatures.112 
Civil Gideon’s supporters have taken a number of different tacks.  The most 
basic is to choose an area of civil law and argue that “fundamental fairness” requires 
appointed counsel.  For example, Russell Engler has argued for civil Gideon in the 
context of some private custody cases,113 Raymond Brescia does the same for 
eviction proceedings,114 Stephen Loffredo and Don Friedman push for a qualified 
right to counsel in welfare proceedings,115 and Jaya Ramji-Nogales and her co-
authors advocate a civil Gideon for asylum proceedings.116  The problem with each 
of these approaches is Lassiter and its presumption against the provision of counsel 
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295, 384 (2007).  
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outside of imprisonment cases.  Further, depending on how you measure the 
equities, none of these areas surpasses a government termination a citizen’s right to 
parent her children. 
An alternate strategy is to advocate for the reversal of Lassiter.117  Gideon 
itself offers some helpful parallels.  For civil Gideon proponents Lassiter is just a 
reprise of Betts v. Brady.  Just as Gideon wisely reversed Betts twenty-one years later, 
Lassiter is likewise ripe for reversal.118  Laura Abel, the co-Director of the Brennan 
Center, has added some other potential parallels.  First, academics and some judges 
were openly scornful of both Betts and Lassiter.119  Second, like Lassiter, Betts called 
for a case-by-case determination of when the due process clause (and the Sixth 
Amendment) required the appointment of a lawyer.  In Gideon this process was 
deemed unwieldy and unworkable, and Abel argues the same is true of Lassiter’s 
case-by-case analysis.120  Lastly, Abel is hopeful that like the twenty-two states that 
filed a brief in support of Gideon, a coalition of states might be found to support the 
overturn of Lassiter.121 
A further parallel is ABA and state bar support for civil Gideon.  While the 
ABA was not closely involved with Gideon, its support for the extension of Gideon to 
misdemeanors was critical to the holding in Argesinger.  Argesinger includes a 
lengthy quote from the ABA in support of appointing lawyers in misdemeanor 
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cases.122  Argesinger also cites ABA authority for the proposition that there are 
sufficient existing lawyers and law students to meet the new constitutional 
requirement123 and that some misdemeanors should be reclassified as non-crimes 
to lessen the need for appointed counsel.124  Chief Justice Burger’s Argesinger 
concurrence noted that the ruling “should cause no surprise to the legal profession,” 
because the ABA had advocated for it in 1968.  Burger goes on to quote at length 
(and with approval) from two different ABA reports pushing for appointed lawyers 
in misdemeanor cases.125  Given the persuasive power of the ABA in Argesinger, the 
power of ABA support for civil Gideon is worth noting. 
The fundamental problem, however, is that Lassiter was a case that arrived 
too long after the due process revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s.  By 1981 the 
Court was in retrenchment mode.  While membership on the court has turned over 
somewhat, it is quite unlikely that the current Court would even take a civil Gideon 
case, let alone reverse Lassiter.  Similarly, this Court’s sensitivity to ABA guidance or 
academic opprobrium (especially in comparison to the Gideon Court) is quite 
limited.  
There have also been efforts to try to find a beachhead for civil Gideon in 
state constitutional law.  Mary Helen McNeal has made the case under Montana 
constitutional law, for example.126  At one point it looked like Maryland might be the 
first state to recognize a broad civil Gideon right.  In 2004 three Justices on the 
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123  Id. at 37 n.7. 
124  Id. at 38 n. 9.  
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Maryland Supreme Court wrote a concurring opinion in Frase v. Barnhart that noted 
the Maryland Constitution’s due process and law of the land clauses, quoted heavily 
from the Lassiter dissents and asserted a civil Gideon right in that state.127   
Nevertheless, two years later in Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh those same three 
Justices found themselves on the losing end of a 4-3 decision that closed the door on 
a civil Gideon right in Maryland.128  While there have been a smattering of state 
legislative successes, no state court has found any sort of broad civil Gideon right.129  
The last group of civil Gideon advocates argue that treaty obligations and 
international law support a civil right to counsel.  There is a growing international 
trend in favor of a right to civil counsel: 
Indeed, the right to counsel in civil matters is well established as a general 
principle of law in the international community.  The European Court of 
Human Rights has construed the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to require a right to civil counsel.  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also recognized the right.  
Nations from Ireland to Madagascar provide broad rights to counsel in civil 
matters, while others, such as South Africa, provide a right to counsel in 
certain matters involving fundamental rights, such as housing.  Finally, the 
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has addressed the right to 
counsel in civil matters, as have the Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination and other United Nations bodies.130 
 
Moreover, the U.S. has signed several treaties – the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Charter of the Organization of American States and The 
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination – 
that require some form of civil representation for the poor.131   
 These arguments seem somewhat compelling, although international law 
advocates have long advocated for treaties to remake American law and in most 
cases it proves to be rather less than hoped for.  In particular, relying on treaties to 
overturn Supreme Court precedent or order large-scale new rights for poor people 
has not proven especially successful over the years.132 
III. The Problems with Civil Gideon – The Problems with Gideon Itself 
 Some advocates for civil Gideon have recognized that some aspects of the 
original Gideon would probably not be worth transporting to the civil arena.  Civil 
Gideon proponent Laura Abel admits that “[t]here have been successes and failures 
in implementing Gideon.”133  Many civil Gideon proponents, however, have attached 
themselves to the concept and language of Gideon without recognizing its significant 
shortcomings.  This makes sense, because Gideon is an iconic, powerful and 
beautifully written case that expresses a vision of American justice that is attractive 
to all.  Anthony Lewis’ Gideon’s Trumpet is perhaps the best non-fiction book about a 
legal case ever written.134 
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 Nevertheless, the reality of criminal defense for the indigent hardly matches 
the rhetoric.135  There is every reason to believe that if civil Gideon became a reality 
the situation on the civil side would be substantially worse. 
 As Stephen Bright, Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, has 
said, “No constitutional right is celebrated so much in the abstract and observed so 
little in reality as the right to counsel.”136  Gideon has foundered on two fronts.  The 
first is the grossly inadequate funding of indigent criminal defense (leading to 
crippling per lawyer caseloads and assembly line justice).  The second is a 
pathetically narrow definition of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Taken together, 
every indigent defendant is guaranteed a warm body with a J.D., but we are far from 
Gideon’s “noble ideal” of “impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal 
before the law.”137 
A. Funding, Caseload and the Inevitable Results 
The funding for indigent defense has been described as a “crisis,”138 a 
“disgrace,”139 “underfunded,”140 “broken,”141 and “unconscionable.”142  Deborah 
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Rhode has done some exceptional work on documenting the funding differentials: 
“The United States spends about a hundred billion dollars annually on criminal 
justice, but only about 2 to 3 percent goes to indigent defense.  Over half is allocated 
to the police, and poor defendants receive only an eighth of the resources per case 
available to prosecutors.”143 
The news from the individual states is likewise grim.  Mary Sue Backus and 
Paul Marcus have an exhaustive article that lists individual statistics and stories of 
funding problems in a diverse list of states: Georgia, Virginia, Louisiana, 
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, Missouri, California, 
Mississippi, Arizona, and Massachusetts.144 
In Knoxville, Tennessee, Mark Stephens, the County Public Defender, has 
repeatedly fought for higher funding, including refusing to take some appointments 
and attempting to withdraw from defending misdemeanors altogether.  As support 
Stephens noted that one staff member alone had 60 cases set for trial, with another 
37 new cases pending appointment in that same courtroom.145  A staff of 18 public 
defenders handles more than 10,000 misdemeanor charges each year and another 
3,000 or more felony charges.146  Nevertheless, the local judges ordered Stephens to 
continue taking misdemeanors.147 
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Stephen Bright has also used the example of McDuffie County, Georgia.148  
The county commission decided that it had been spending too much on indigent 
defense.  The county commissioners decided to solicit bids.  They specified no 
qualifications and their only goal was to cut costs.  They awarded the contract to the 
lowest bidder at a discount of 40% from their previous expenditure.  For the first 
three years of the contract, the new lawyer tried only one felony case to a jury while 
entering 213 guilty pleas in felony cases and filing only three motions in the three 
years.149 
The funding problems lead inevitably to crippling caseloads.  Erica 
Hashimoto offers multiple examples of excessive caseloads: 
In 2003, public defenders statewide in Minnesota handled more than 900 
cases per attorney per year.  In 2001, a trial staff of fifty-two lawyers at the 
public defender office in Hamilton County, Ohio, which encompasses much of 
the Cincinnati metropolitan area, handled 34,644 cases, an average of 666 
cases per attorney.  In Maryland in 2002, the public defender office, which 
had not increased in size in five years, reported that it would have to hire 300 
attorneys just to meet national caseload standards.  In 1996, staff attorneys 
at the Office of the Public Defender in Orange County, California maintained 
caseloads of 610 cases.  In 2004 in Kentucky, public defenders handled an 
average 489 cases per lawyer.150 
 
These caseloads make it very unlikely that any individual client will receive a 
vigorous defense.  As one public defender noted, it is not really very complicated 
math: “When caseloads are so high that a public defender can only spend 3.8 hours 
per case, including serious felony cases, [we] cannot ensure reliability.”151 
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 Studies of appointed counsel have found that the caseload and funding 
incentives have played out predictability.  For instance, an infamous study of 
appointed counsel in New York City found that defense attorneys visited crime 
scenes and interviewed witnesses in only 21% of homicides and in a shocking 4% of 
non-homicide felonies.152  Defense counsel appointed experts in only 17% of the 
homicides and in just 2% of all felony cases.153  More recent studies suggest these 
figures are fairly typical.154 
 Likewise, systems that rely upon individual appointed defense counsel (as 
opposed to a permanent staff of public defenders) face significant structural 
problems.  Any system that relies upon appointed counsel faces the danger that 
judges will appoint the lawyers that make their lives and the lives of prosecutors 
easiest: less competent or more compliant lawyers who will look to plead as many 
cases as possible.155  In systems where budget pressures are severe or there are 
caps on fees lawyers face natural pressures to do less (or as little as possible) on 
their cases, because any work beyond a fee cap is basically done for free.156   
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In systems where public defenders or appointed counsel carry a large 
caseload the interests of defense lawyers suddenly align powerfully with 
prosecutors and judges: their primary interest becomes the pursuit of efficient 
docket control.  Game theory suggests that players in iterated games have greater 
incentives to cooperate than one-time players.157  In the game of criminal defense 
the judge, the criminal defense lawyers and the prosecutors are the regular players, 
the indigent defendants come and go. 
 Beyond the systematic evidence are a series of jaw-dropping anecdotes.  
Consider just a few of those gathered by Backus and Marcus:  
In a case of mistaken identity, Henry Earl Clark of Dallas was charged with a 
drug offense in Tyler, Texas. After his arrest, it took six weeks in jail before 
he was assigned a lawyer, as he was too poor to afford one on his own. It took 
seven more weeks after the appointment of the lawyer, until the case was 
dismissed, for it to become obvious that the police had arrested the wrong 
man. . . .  During this time, he lost his job and his car, which was auctioned.  
After Clark was released, he spent several months in a homeless shelter. 
 
Sixteen-year-old Denise Lockett was retarded and pregnant. Her baby died 
when she delivered it in a toilet in her home in a South Georgia housing 
project. Although an autopsy found no indication that the baby's death had 
been caused by any intentional act, the prosecutor charged Lockett with first-
degree murder. Her appointed lawyer had a contract to handle all the 
county's criminal cases, about 300 cases in a year, for a flat fee. He performed 
this work on top of that required by his private practice with paying clients. 
The lawyer conducted no investigation of the facts, introduced no evidence of 
his client's mental retardation or of the autopsy findings, and told her to 
plead guilty to manslaughter. She was sentenced to twenty years in prison. 
 
A defendant in Missoula, Montana, was jailed for nearly six months leading 
up to his trial. During the months before his trial, the defendant met with his 
court-appointed attorney just two times. That attorney did nothing to 
investigate the defendant's allegations that police obtained evidence against 
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him during an illegal search. A second court-appointed lawyer subsequently 
had the case dismissed.158 
 
As William Stuntz has well stated “The result is that a typical indigent defendant 
receives not an advocate able and willing to make the best case for him, but an 
overworked bureaucrat whose only realistic option is to plead the case out as 
quickly as possible.”159  As a result dedicated former criminal defense lawyers 
suggest loosening the Sixth Amendment to recognize the necessity of indigent 
defense “triage”160 or that misdemeanor defense be abandoned altogether.161   
Lawyers have challenged both the funding for indigent defense and excessive 
caseloads, but courts have generally demurred and even in the cases where 
additional funding was awarded the gains proved short lived.162  Courts have 
avoided the issue through abstention doctrine, separation of powers concerns and a 
general distaste for overturning legislative budget decisions.163  An unwritten factor 
is undoubtedly how well an underfunded and overburdened system fits the judicial 
interest in rapidly processing huge dockets.  More, better paid lawyers with fewer 
cases would likely change a system where 90% of convictions result from guilty 
pleas.164 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
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Despite all of these systemic problems, robust appellate review of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims could at least offer some relief to defendants shuffled 
through the plea machine.  Instead, Strickland v. Washington165 makes proving 
ineffective assistance of counsel quite difficult and guarantees that only the most 
serious and obvious cases of incompetence will result in relief.    
Gideon was decided in 1963, but it was not until 1984 that the Court got 
around to defining ineffective assistance of counsel.  The reticence to tackle this 
issue and the fact that Gideon guaranteed a lawyer, but gave no substance to the 
quality of that guarantee are part of a pattern with ineffective assistance: courts 
want to presume lawyers effective and move on.  This is partially because some or 
many of the defendants claiming ineffective assistance are likely guilty, but the 
bigger part is every court’s hesitance to call a fellow lawyer ineffective.  For 
example, one of the earliest pre-Strickland standards for ineffective assistance was 
whether the lawyer was so bad he made the case a “farce and a mockery of 
justice.”166 
In Strickland the Court announced a two-prong test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel: a defendant must show that his lawyer's representation was deficient 
(the performance prong); and that the deficient performance affected the outcome 
(the prejudice prong).  The performance prong requires “a showing that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”167   The 
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prejudice prong requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”168   The Court makes clear that if either prong fails, an ineffective 
assistance claim fails and that courts can consider either prong first.169  The 
combination of these two prongs and the Court’s invitation to skip the performance 
prong to jump right to the prejudice prong, means that while the farce and mockery 
standard is technically dead its spirit lives on. 
The Court’s description of its standard for effectiveness leaves little doubt 
that it does not want to see attorney performance second-guessed or held 
ineffective with any great regularity.  Consider the extremely loose “reasonably 
competent attorney” standard.170  The Court flatly refuses to classify any lawyer 
activity (other than a lawyer with an actual conflict of interest) as per se ineffective 
or unreasonable. 171  Instead, the Court notes that lawyering is an “art,” that lawyer 
behavior cannot be classified, that there are not “mechanical rules” in the area and, 
as a result, it cannot offer any specific guidance to lower courts about what 
particular behavior might be ineffective.172   
Even after stating this extremely flexible standard the Court waters it down 
further by repeatedly emphasizing how deferential reviewing courts should be to 
lawyers.  At points it appears the Court is struggling to find different ways of 
expressing their deference.  Consider the following: 
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Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all 
too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after 
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 
counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . .  Because of the 
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.  There are countless ways to provide 
effective assistance in any given case.  Even the best criminal defense 
attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. 173    
 
One might think the language above would be sufficient to protect against reviewing 
courts looking very carefully at these claims, but the Court keeps coming back to 
presumptions of effectiveness and deference.  Immediately following the passage 
above, the Court reiterates “that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance.”174  One page later, the Court adds that reviewing courts should 
apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”175  Lastly, the Court 
reminds us of the “strong presumption of reliability.”176 
Nevertheless, the Court virtually guarantees that even the extremely 
deferential review it outlines above will rarely occur.  This is because the Court 
requires a defendant to prove prejudice, “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”177  In practice, this has meant that a defendant must 
prove either innocence or the loss of an important substantive or procedural right.  
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This is quite a stringent standard and many ineffective assistance claims fail on the 
prejudice prong. 
 This works out nicely for courts that want to avoid labeling an attorney’s 
representation ineffective.  The Court goes out of its way to make this point:  
In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result 
of the alleged deficiencies.  The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 
grade counsel’s performance.  If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we will expect will 
often be so, that course should be followed.178 
 
Thus, even the prejudice prong is stacked to ensure that courts will not have to 
address the attorney behavior at issue. 
There is also a procedural protection barring many ineffective assistance 
claims: those claims are generally brought in what’s called “collateral proceedings,” 
instead of on direct appeal.  This means that the first time that most ineffective 
assistance claims are raised is in a federal habeus corpus or state collateral attack on 
a criminal conviction.179  These sorts of actions arise only after a criminal defendant 
has exhausted her direct appeals, which means that they occur years and years after 
the original trial.  Thus, for anyone serving a sentence of fewer than 3-5 years, an 
ineffective assistance claim is unlikely.  This practice insulates all of that defense 
work from review.180 
 Not surprisingly, ineffective assistance claims are extremely hard to win and 
courts have proven deferential indeed.  One example is the series of sleeping lawyer 
                                                        
178  Id. at 697. 
179  See Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504-5 (2003). 
180  See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007). 
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cases where the defendants have lost.  As one judge famously opined, “The 
Constitution says that everyone is entitled to an attorney of their choice.  But the 
Constitution does not say that the lawyer has to be awake.”181  Likewise, a Texas 
Appellate Court held that a sleeping lawyer’s naps might have been a “strategic 
move” because “the jury might have sympathy for appellant because of” the naps.182  
In analyzing these cases, some courts have used a three-part analysis: did counsel 
sleep often, was counsel unconscious or just resting, and did counsel miss a key part 
of the trial while asleep.183  Consider the following from Stephen Bright: 
Calvin Burdine and Carl Johnson were represented at their capital trials in 
Houston by the same court-appointed attorney, who slept during parts of 
their trials. In Burdine's case, the clerk of the court testified that “defense 
counsel was asleep on several occasions on several days over the course of 
the proceedings.”  The lawyer's file on the case contained only three pages of 
notes.  Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that a 
sleeping attorney was sufficient “counsel” under the Sixth Amendment.  Both 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that Carl Johnson was not denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel even though the lawyer slept through much of 
the trial and, as one observer noted, “the ineptitude of the lawyer . . . jumps 
off the printed page.”  Neither court published its opinion. Carl Johnson was 
executed on September 19, 1995.184 
 
 Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel claims have hardly proven an effective 
protection against the individual woes of an underfunded, overburdened system of 
indigent defense. 
                                                        
181  Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, THE NATION, Apr. 7, 1997, at 27-29 (quoting Judge Doug 
Shaver). 
182  McFarland v. State, 928 S.W. 2d 482, 506 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
183  See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687-90 
(2d Cir. l996).  Similarly, reviewing courts have deferentially reviewed allegations of lawyers who 
were drunk or high at the time of trial and denied some for a lack of prejudice.  Ira Mickenberg, 
Drunk, Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers: Is It Possible to Keep Innocent People Off Death Row?, 29 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 319, 323 (2004) and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 425, 426, 455-63 (1996) provide an excellent overview of these cases. 
184  Bright, supra note __, at 14. 
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C. The Corrosive Effects of the Betrayal of Gideon 
The combination of low funding, high case loads and little appellate oversight 
of lawyer quality has naturally resulted in a system that is plea driven and “depends 
less on adversarial process and more on practices akin to those found in 
administrative and inquisitorial settings.”185  This perversion of the “noble ideal” of 
Gideon is more than merely ironic.  It is positively corrosive to the rule of law. 
Start from the point of view of the indigent defendants that make up 
approximately 80% of the criminal justice caseload.186  From the indigent client’s 
perspective their lawyer is too often seen as part of the system, rather than as the 
shining knight envisioned by Gideon.  Consider the following from Stephen 
Schulhofer and David Friedman: 
Indigents commonly mistrust the public defender assigned to them and view 
him as part of the same court bureaucracy that is “processing” and convicting 
them. The lack of trust is a major obstacle to establishing an effective 
attorney-client relationship.  The problem was captured in a sad exchange 
between a social science researcher and a prisoner: “Did you have a lawyer 
when you went to court?”  “No. I had a public defender.”187 
 
This fundamental distrust does more than destroy the lawyer-client relationship: it 
makes a mockery of the promises made by Gideon and any arresting officer’s offer of 
an appointed lawyer to an arrestee that cannot afford one. 
 Consider the effect on the entire criminal defense bar to have the bulk of 
clients “triaged” and knowing that almost any level of representation will be ruled 
                                                        
185  Brown, supra note __, at 1587.    
186  See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, INDIGENT DEFENSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED 
FINDINGS 4 (1996) (noting data from the nation's 75 largest counties indicate that about 80% of 
felony defendants relied on either public defenders or assigned counsel for legal representation). 
187  Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective 
Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 86 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
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effective on appeal.  Both sides of the shame of Gideon have a powerful downward 
pull on the quality of representation (as lowered standards and expectations are 
met) and on the quality of justice as a whole.  As each player in the system gets used 
to cutting corners pretty soon a system designed as a square has become a circle. 
 Likewise, consider the psychological weight that incompetent lawyering 
imposes on all of the players in the system.  Start with the judges and consider Judge 
David Bazelon’s classic phrase for some criminal defense lawyers, “[w]alking 
violations of the Sixth Amendment,” as well as his description of the judicial struggle 
over how to handle these situations.188   
Even the Supreme Court has expressed discomfort with the “assembly line 
justice” that America’s criminal justice system now embodies.  There is a long 
section in Argesinger v. Hamlin where the Court decries the state of the 
misdemeanor prosecution circa 1972:  
[T]he volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony 
prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of 
the fairness of the result.  The Report by the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society, states: 
 
For example, until legislation last year increased the number of 
judges, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions had four 
judges to process the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony 
cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 petty offenses 
and an equal number of traffic offenses per year.  An inevitable 
consequence of volume that large is the almost total preoccupation in 
such a court with the movement of cases.  The calendar is long, speed 
often is substituted for care, and casually arranged out-of-court 
compromise too often is substituted for adjudiciation.  Inadequate 
attention tends to be given to the individual defendant, whether in 
protecting his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the social risk 
                                                        
188  Bazelon, supra note __, at 2-15. 
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he presents, or determining how to deal with him after conviction.  
The frequent result is futility and failure.  
 
Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the criminal 
process, there is scant regard for them as individuals. They are 
numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their 
way. The gap between the theory and the reality is enormous.  Very 
little such observation of the administration of criminal justice in 
operation is required to reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic 
ills. . . .  The misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and 
frequently irresponsible preparation on the part of the defense, the 
prosecution, and the court. Everything is rush, rush.  There is evidence 
of the prejudice which results to misdemeanor defendants from this 
‘assembly-line justice.’189  
 
There are a couple of poignant aspects to the above quote.  It is sad to think of how 
little Argesinger itself did to ameliorate the problems listed above.  If anything, 
things are worse now than before.190  Moreover, it is amazing that in 1972 (during 
the closing stages of the due process revolution), in an opinion written by Chief 
Justice Burger, the Court would write so eloquently about the death of the trial and 
the birth of the rushed, overcrowded assembly line of justice that has marked 
American justice from then until now. 
Criminal defense lawyers also cannot help but notice the structural 
difficulties with the system or the regular appearance of substandard 
practitioners.191  Likewise prosecutors struggle with their role in a system that 
offers some defendants so little.192  In sum, no thoughtful participant or observer in 
                                                        
189  Argesinger, 407 U.S. at 34-35. 
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the American justice system can fail to notice the grave gap between the rhetoric 
and the reality.  Hypocrisy of this kind does more than disappoint: it devours a 
system from the inside out and mocks the meat it feeds on.193 
It is also worth noting the critical role that underfunded criminal defense 
programs play in silencing indigent criminal defendants.  Alexandra Natapoff has 
noted the debilitating, silencing effect the entire criminal justice system has upon 
these defendants.194  Assigning lawyers with no time or energy to actually know or 
even hear their client makes the alienating experience of criminal prosecution even 
worse: the one person who should care enough to listen to the defendant’s full story 
has no time to do so.  Psychological studies have shown that when a litigant does not 
feel “heard” in a legal process they perceive the entire process as fundamentally 
unfair.195 
D. Do We Really Want to Transplant Gideon’s Baggage to Civil Settings? 
Let me start by saying that if the criminal justice system is a travesty, the 
great bulk of the current pro se civil justice system is even worse.  Nevertheless, 
unlike civil Gideon there are signs that efforts to ameliorate pro se civil 
representation are occurring and accelerating.  More importantly, real court reform 
would prove much, much more egalitarian or workable than a civil Gideon system. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Violation of the Sixth Amendment” If You're Trying to Put That Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 997 (2000) (arguing that such a system would prove unworkable in practice). 
193  Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3 (jealousy “is the green-eyed monster which doth 
mock the meat it feeds on”). 
194  See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 
1452-54 (2005).  
195  See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1, 37-43 (2009). 
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In fact, the corrosive effects of Gideon would likely be greatly amplified in the 
civil setting.  First, note that the problems of crippling caseloads and woeful funding 
occur in the context of serious crimes.  In fact, many of the most powerful examples 
of Gideon’s failures come in death penalty cases.196  If reviewing courts and 
legislatures cannot see the worth in adequately funding capital defense, what hope 
is there for adequate funding for defense of a termination of parental rights 
proceeding, let alone a landlord-tenant action? 
Similarly, consider the annual battles over legal aid funding as a precursor.  
Advocates for the poor have long complained about legal aid’s woeful funding.197  
Given the funding choke back and the addition of restrictions on that funding,198 the 
hopes for warm legislative support of civil Gideon are unfounded. 
There is also the possibility that creating a civil Gideon would export the 
debilitating disrespect for the rule of law that has followed along with Gideon.  It is 
not hard to imagine the same pro se courts that are choked with litigants today 
staffed by one or two government paid lawyers (at the lowest salary possible) 
taking on 60 eviction cases a day, with the same results as Gideon’s criminal defense: 
little individual attention, investigation or advocacy.  In short, civil Gideon would 
likely look like criminal Gideon on steroids – overwhelmed lawyers, frustrated 
clients and no justice. 
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Civil Gideon would also likely spark a civil Strickland – as a constitutional 
guarantee of counsel would necessarily implicate some minimum standard for 
lawyer competence.  This standard would likely be the same or even lower than 
Strickland, with the inevitable effect that extremely poor lawyering in civil courts 
would be acceptable as “effective.”  Gideon’s shortcomings would only be 
exacerbated in a civil transplant. 
E. The Jurisprudential Difficulties with Civil Gideon 
Along with the many logistical concerns listed above, there are significant 
jurisprudential reasons for avoiding an expansion of Gideon to civil cases.  Gideon is 
part of a pantheon of cases that are considered unassailable and obviously correct199 
and this Article does not dispute the correctness of Gideon in principle.   
Nevertheless, because Gideon itself was not a foreseen application of either 
the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause it should be expanded carefully.  
While it may be true that Gideon was based upon the “obvious truth” that indigent 
felony defendants need representation for a fair trial, it is not necessarily true that 
all further applications are.  The trick is to tease out which are and which are not. 
Gideon is a classic living constitution case.  This is because neither the 
framers of the Sixth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment expected that 
these amendments would guarantee a free lawyer to indigent defendants.  A 
defendant’s right to have a lawyer if he could afford one was well established at the 
time of the passage of the Bill of Rights in both federal and state trials and it is that 
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right that the original Sixth Amendment protects.200  This is so because there 
certainly was not a right to appointed counsel at the time of the passage of the Bill of 
Rights.201  If the Framers had known that the Sixth Amendment might guarantee a 
government supplied lawyer to criminal defendants, ratification debates would have 
likely mentioned it and the right to counsel would have been much more 
controversial.  
Instead, the right to counsel was the subject of little debate202 and gave 
federal constitutional standing to a rule that was already in effect in the colonies and 
at American common law.  The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was 
a clear rejection of contemporaneous English common law, which allowed defense 
lawyers in misdemeanor prosecutions, but not in the more serious cases of treason 
or a felony.203  Since most felonies at common law were punishable by death, this 
meant that British defendants were allowed counsel in less serious cases but not in 
potential death penalty cases.204 
Although this rule was adhered to in England until 1836, it was rejected by 
the American colonies.  Twelve of the thirteen colonies lawfully recognized the right 
of appearance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions, with the exception of one or 
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two instances in which it was limited to more serious crimes.205  Thus, there was 
little controversy or discussion over the right to counsel.  When the framers drafted 
the Sixth Amendment, the inclusion of the right to counsel formalized a right that 
was already well established in the States.   
Nevertheless, there was not universal or even regular appointment of 
counsel in felony cases at that time and the appointments that occurred were as a 
result of a statute and not any constitutional mandate.  Betts v. Brady may have been 
dead wrong as a matter of policy, justice or fairness, but it was spot on with its 
history.  Betts carefully canvassed state constitutional and statutory law at the time 
of the passage of the Sixth Amendment and concluded that the state constitutions 
only protected the right to be represented by counsel, not a right to free appointed 
counsel.206  Moreover, if a free lawyer was provided it was generally by statute and 
limited to death penalty cases.207   
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Connecticut had no statute although it was the custom of the courts to assign counsel in all 
criminal cases. Swift, ‘System of Laws, Connecticut’, 1796, Vol. II, p. 392. In Delaware Penn's 
Laws of 1719, ch. XXII and in Pennsylvania the Act of May 31, 1718, s III (Mitchell and 
Flanders' Statutes at Large of Penna., 1682-1801, Vol. III, p. 201) provided for appointment 
only in case of ‘felonies of death’. Georgia has never had any law on the subject. Maryland 
had no such law at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. An Act of 1777 in 
Massachusetts gave the right to have counsel appointed in cases of treason or misprision of 
treason. Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from Nov. 28, 1780 to Feb. 28, 1807, 
Ch. LXXI, Vol. II, Appendix, p. 1049. By an Act of Feb. 8, 1791, New Hampshire required 
appointment in all cases where the punishment was death. Metcalf's Laws of New 
Hampshire, 1916, Vol. 5, pp. 596, 599. An Act of New Jersey of Mch. 6, 1795, s 2, required 
appointment in the case of any person tried upon an indictment. Acts of the General 
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356-7. An Act of 1777 of North Carolina made no provision for appointment, but accorded 
defendants the right to have counsel. Laws of North Carolina, 1789, pp. 40, 56. Rhode Island 
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Likewise, at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment there was 
not a well-established right to appointed counsel.  The mid-nineteenth century was, 
in fact, a time of court de-professionalization where in many states there were 
virtually no requirements for admission to the bar and pro se practice was quite 
common.208 
So, based on any original understanding of the Sixth or Fourteenth 
Amendments Gideon is clearly a living constitution case.  In fact, Gideon itself 
inspired an early use of that phrase in an article by Charles A. Reich entitled Mr. 
Justice Black and the Living Constitution.209 
Nevertheless, the Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause is “a 
concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and 
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights” and is to be tested against notions of 
“fundamental fairness” and not a rigid application of the framers’ intent.210  So, 
Gideon was certainly on firm ground in reading the Due Process Clause according to 
contemporary standards of fundamental fairness.211  Gideon’s appeal to the “obvious 
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truth” that a felony defendant could not navigate a trial without appointed counsel 
also fit the Court’s flexible approach to due process. 
Nevertheless, the key problem with expanding Gideon is that every step 
beyond the “obvious truth” of felony defense and the general consensus among the 
states that Betts should be overruled weakens the force of Gideon.  If we start from 
the premise that Gideon was unquestionably correct, we still have to craft criteria 
for expansion.  Without such criteria the Court risks replacing legislatively crafted 
funding priorities with judicial priorities.  When there is a demonstrable shift in 
pubic opinion and an obvious miscarriage of justice as in Gideon the Court is on firm 
ground. 
As the Court strays from firm ground messy problems arise.  The guarantee 
of appointed misdemeanor counsel in Argesinger is an excellent example.  The Court 
rejected the opportunity to limit the right to appointed counsel to more serious 
cases in the same manner that it had limited the right to a jury trial – to non-petty 
offenses.212  Instead the Court held that before an indigent defendant can be 
convicted and spend a single day in jail she must have had the service of an 
appointed lawyer. 
Argesinger is problematic in a number of regards.  First, unlike Gideon, 
appointed misdemeanor counsel was not common in the federal or state court 
systems and there was not a groundswell of support from the states or elsewhere 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other States, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left intact.  Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, 
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for such a holding.213  In Gideon the federal courts had long guaranteed counsel for 
felonies and many states did as well.  Argesinger is silent on this point, but the briefs 
suggest that neither the federal court practice nor federal statutes extended the 
right to appointed counsel as far as Argesinger did and that only a handful of states 
assigned attorneys in similar circumstances.214   
Second, Argesinger privileged the right to appointed counsel – which was not 
an original right in the Sixth Amendment – above the right to a jury, which 
historically was considered to be the single most important Sixth Amendment 
right.215  Thomas Jefferson, among other framers, considered the right to a jury of 
paramount importance: “Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best 
be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to 
leave them out of the Legislative.  The execution of the laws is more important than 
the making of them.”216  This created an anomalous result within the due process 
revolution of the 1960s: the procedural right most valued by the framers (the jury 
trial) was treated worse than a right not even recognized at the time of the framing 
(a right to appointed counsel in virtually all criminal trials).217 
                                                        
213  Unlike Gideon, there was only one amicus brief from a State in Argesinger: the State of Utah 
argued for the petty/non-petty distinction.  See Brief for the State of Utah, Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25 (1972) (No. 70-5015), 1971 WL 126422. 
214  See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (No. 70-
5015), 1971 WL 126425, at *29-30. 
215  BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS, Ch. 3 (2009) (manuscript on file with author). 
216 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 
364 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  Similarly, John Adams wrote that juries should 
have “as compleat a Controul, as decisive a Negative, in every Judgment of a Court of Judicature” as 
the legislature has to veto executive action.  John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 
1771), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 229 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). 
217  In fact, the petty crime exception to the right to a jury trial is one of the very few areas of the 
1960s due process revolution where individual rights went backwards.  Both in federal and state law, 
the petty crime exception was not firmly established at six months of potential imprisonment before 
 57
Third, assigning counsel when even one day may be spent in jail sets a 
relatively low barrier for the liberty interest involved and creates future line 
drawing problems.  The best argument against Lassiter is that many parents would 
spend much more than a day in jail to avoid losing their parental rights.  If the 
Constitution requires an appointed lawyer in one case, it seems perverse to deny it 
in the other.  
Lastly, and most importantly, there is an excellent argument to be made that 
the inglorious fate of Gideon was sealed with Argesinger.  It was not impossible to 
predict that misdemeanor representation might overwhelm the system for 
appointing lawyers or that the inevitably high caseloads might result in substandard 
lawyering.  To the contrary, both the Argesinger majority and the concurrence that 
rejected a mandate for appointed counsel discussed that exact issue.218 
The above arguments against Argesinger are even more potent for civil 
Gideon.  In Lassiter no state had found a broad based constitutional right to civil 
representation for the indigent.  While most states did so in termination of parental 
rights cases as a matter of statute, none of those states pushed in favor of such a 
constitutional right in Lassiter, while six states joined a brief arguing the opposite.219  
Civil Gideon proponents have wisely begun to lobby states to support a right to 
appointed civil counsel,220 but under the current fiscal circumstances that effort 
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appears rather quixotic.  It is worth noting a recent success on that front, however.  
In the teeth of potential state bankruptcy California recently passed a limited civil 
Gideon right in their state courts.221 
There are also reasons to be concerned about the role of judges choosing 
when the state should pay for appointed lawyers.  I have argued elsewhere that 
there is a powerful lawyer-judge bias, i.e. judges will frequently privilege the legal 
profession in their decisions, constitutional or otherwise.222  For civil Gideon the 
interests of judges and lawyers do not necessarily square with the indigent, let alone 
the public at large.  In civil Gideon (as elsewhere) lawyers have an incentive to 
prefer more employment to less.  Thus we see the ABA and a number of state bars 
pushing for a right to appointed civil counsel.223  Likewise, judges are generally 
hostile to pro se litigation and the more represented parties there are the easier 
most judge’s jobs will be.224   
Exactly how the preferences of indigent litigants are considered, however, is 
harder to see.  Obviously all else being equal any litigant would prefer a fairer court 
procedure.  When the cost of a civil Gideon is factored in, however, it becomes a 
harder question.  For example, it would not be irrational for poor litigants to prefer 
that any money spent on their problems go to direct assistance, rather than a free 
lawyer.  For example, if an indigent person facing eviction had a choice, she would 
                                                                                                                                                                     
visited October 15, 2009) (noting that civil Gideon advocates are lobbying state and local 
governments as well as pursuing litigation strategies). 
221  See Tamara Audi, ‘Civil Gideon’ Trumpets Legal Discord, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125659997034609181.html (last visited January 2, 2010). 
222  See BARTON, supra note __. 
223  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
224  See Jonathan D. Glater, In a Downturn More Act as Their Own Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at 
A1 (describing judicial difficulties with a surge in pro se litigation). 
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often choose help with finding a new apartment or a few more weeks in their 
apartment over a free, but overburdened and underpaid, lawyer.  Moreover, if it is 
true that pro se court reform can make the system fairer at a lower cost, indigent 
litigants might well prefer that option. 
In this regard the civil Gideon movement is reminiscent of the Court’s 
differential treatment between procedural due process rights and substantive due 
process rights.  When faced with an aggrieved poor person the Court has either 
offered extra levels of process or turned its back.225  Nevertheless, process can never 
replace substance.  So, before a welfare recipient can lose her benefits the Court has 
held that the government must provide a hearing and other levels of due process.226  
Nevertheless, there is no absolute right to welfare benefits or any other government 
assistance.227  It says a lot about the mindset of judges that the high water mark for 
constitutional rights for the poor is the right to a hearing, rather than a right to basic 
sustenance or shelter.  That said, from an indigent person’s point of view, which 
would you rather have: a hearing or a right to the benefit itself? 
In sum, it is fair to be suspicious of courts and bar associations when they 
come to help the poor.  Experience teaches that the most the poor can hope for is 
more lawyers or more process, with little of substance to show for it.  Moreover, it is 
not clear that spending on poverty programs is not a zero sum game.  If that is the 
case, the choice of process over substance was doubly destructive: paying for the 
                                                        
225  Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that procedural due process 
requires a hearing before the termination of a welfare recipient's benefits) with Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 486 (1970) (no right to welfare benefits); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 
(1972) (no right to basic shelter either). 
226 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. 
227  Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484, 486 (1970) (no right to welfare benefits); Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 56 
(1972) (no right to basic shelter); see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. 
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layers of due process that now “protect” the poor from losing various benefits may 
actually lower the absolute amount of those benefits.  If the same were true of 
paying for a civil Gideon the appointment of free civil lawyers would be particularly 
ironic. 
IV. Pro se Reform 
 Even if the above argument is wrong on the merits and as a matter of policy, 
why is it that the answer to this sort of challenge is always more lawyers?  Why not 
a change in the nature of the courts?  Keep in mind that the question of a remedy is 
different from the question of a constitutional violation.  Even if the civil Gideon 
proponents are spot on that forcing indigent civil litigants to proceed pro se is a 
violation of fundamental fairness and due process, they are not necessarily correct 
that a free lawyer is the appropriate response.  A court could just as easily order 
fundamental changes in court procedures as a remedy.  Below I lay out the 
argument for the superiority of pro se court reform as a solution to an undeniable 
problem. 
 First a word of definition is necessary.  When this Article refers to pro se 
court reform, that phrase means the reform of courts that feature a regularized 
majority (or at least plurality) of pro se matters.  These courts are targeted because 
they are the most likely to be open to reform out of necessity.  Further, if all of these 
courts were reformed it would make a massive difference in the lives of people too 
poor to hire their own lawyers.   
A. It is Already Starting to Happen 
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Aside from the arguments listed above against civil Gideon, there remains a 
very prosaic reason to prefer pro se court reform to civil Gideon: pro se reform may 
actually happen.  Civil Gideon has gained traction with bar associations, legal 
academics and many advocates for the poor.  Nevertheless, it has gained little 
traction among the constituencies that matter – the judges and justices who might 
require it constitutionally and the state and federal legislatures who could pass 
legislation granting it.228  Under the current fiscal situations of the state and federal 
governments legislative action appears remote indeed.229  Similarly, courts that 
were already reticent to order the appointment of free lawyers in civil cases will be 
even more hesitant. 
By comparison, the pro se court reform train is warmed up and leaving the 
station.  This is largely by necessity.  Whether courts want to avoid it or not, waves 
of pro se litigants are now the norm in many lower courts across the country and 
court reform – while difficult – is often the only solution. 
The first and best sign of progress are publications, conferences and 
discussions among state court judges.230  In 2005, the American Judicature Society 
published a guide entitled Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-
                                                        
228  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
229  But see Tamara Audi, ‘Civil Gideon’ Trumpets Legal Discord, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125659997034609181.html (last visited January 2, 2010). 
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academics not judges.  See, e.g.,  Brennan Center for Justice, Civil Gideon Symposium to Open ABA’s 
Equal Justice Conference; Request for Papers on Right to Civil Counsel for Temple Political and Civil 
Rights Law Review, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/civil_gideon_symposium_to_open_aba_s_equal_justice
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Represented Litigants.231  It includes a long list of common sense things that judges 
are allowed to do to help pro se litigants, including making procedural 
accommodations, being courteous, avoiding legal jargon and procedural snafus, 
explaining the process, avoiding over-familiarity with lawyers in the courtroom, and 
training court staff so they provide patient, helpful service to self-represented 
litigants.232  It also includes a long section on “Best Practices for Cases Involving 
Self-Represented Litigants.”233  This report follows up on 1998’s Meeting the 
Challenge of Pro Se Litigation.234  AJS has also published a set of core materials that 
gathers the best and most innovative approaches to pro se reform being used 
nationally.235 
  In 2002 the National Center for State Courts released The Self-Help Friendly 
Court: Designed from the Ground Up to Work for People Without Lawyers.236  The 
Preface is written by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and 
references California’s recent efforts, including a 900-page self help web site visited 
                                                        
231  CYNTHIA GRAY, REACHING OUT OR OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 1-2 
(2005). 
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reminds me of the Simpsons episode where Homer has to take a court-mandated parenting class and 
the instructor tells the class to “put your garbage in a garbage can, people.  I can't stress that enough.  
Don't just throw it out the window."  Homer responds “Garbage in garbage can . . . hmm, makes 
sense."  The Simpsons: Home Sweet Homediddly-Dum-Doodily (Fox television broadcast Oct. 1, 1995). 
233  GRAY, supra note __, at 51-58. 
234   JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION (1998).  
235 THE SELF REPRESENTED LITIGATION NETWORK, CORE MATERALS ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION 
INNOVATION (2006). 
236  RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE 
WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_ProSe_SelfHelpCtPub.pdf.  AJS actually has a 
whole website dedicated to the topic, www.ajs.org/prose/home.asp.  See also Richard Zorza, Self-
Represented Litigation and the Access to Justice Revolution in the State Courts: Cross Pollinating 
Perspectives Towards a Dialog for Innovation in the Courts and the Administrative System, 29 J. NAT’L 
ASSOC. ADMINISTRATIVE L. JUDICIARY 63 (2009). 
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by over 100,000 people a month.237  While these guides are not perfect or 
particularly visionary, if pro se courts around the country adopted their suggested 
reforms it would make a huge difference in the lives of the indigent, as well as 
making the courts fairer and more efficient. 
The California website is just one of many governmental or non-profit sites 
that aim to ease the pro se experience.  SelfHelpSupport.org is a website set up for 
courts, community groups, poverty lawyers and academics interested in forwarding 
the cause of pro se reform.238  Lawhelp.org is a Probono.net website that is aimed at 
pro se litigants themselves and forwards the litigants on to each state’s legal aid 
website, some of which are stronger than others.  Nevertheless, it is a free site aimed 
at helping pro se litigants. 
There are a number of individual courts that are trying quite innovative 
approaches.  For example, Lois Bloom and Helen Herschkoff describe the creation of 
a special federal magistrate position in the Eastern District of New York assigned to 
hear significant categories of pro se matters, the first federal district to assign a 
single magistrate in this manner.239  Ronald Staudt and Paula Hannaford have 
gathered a number of innovative court processes into one National Center for State 
Courts supported research project.240  San Antonio and other cities have established 
                                                        
237  Zorza, supra note __, at 7-8.  The web site can be found here: 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/ (last visited July 7, 2009). 
238  See www.selfhelpsupport.org (last visited July 7, 2009). 
239  See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 475, 476-77 (2002). 
240  See Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Access to Justice for the Self-Represented Litigant: An 
Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers and Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017 (2002). 
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specialized pro se courts adopting many of the suggestions for court structure listed 
above.241 
There has been significant scholarly interest in the topic as well.  Russell 
Engler has written two tremendous articles on pro se reform.  The first advocates a 
mass shift in the roles of clerks, judges and mediators to meet the new prominence 
of pro se and the second explores the judicial ethical challenges (and opportunities) 
involved in such a shift.242  Russell Pearce has argued that judges in pro se courts 
should replace the traditional role of neutral arbiter with active questioning aimed 
at ensuring that procedural and substantive justice prevails.243  Naturally, there 
have been critics and opponents,244 but the discussion itself, as well as the very real 
progress being made in multiple jurisdictions, is heartening. 
B. The Tip of the Spear 
A main conceptual problem with civil Gideon is that it is a deeply 
conservative and backward looking solution: it starts with the assumption that 
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nothing in the current structure or process of the court should change and that the 
only way to address the disadvantages the poor face is to appoint more free lawyers.  
By contrast pro se court reform starts with a fundamental change in court attitude 
(from passive neutrality to assistance and notice of the unrepresented).  The Self-
Help Friendly Court is a helpful document in this regard, as it tries to work forwards 
from the problem itself – making court processes fair for unrepresented litigants – 
to solutions, rather than backwards from ways to ameliorate the existing system.245  
While the solutions suggested are still relatively modest, the authors ask the exact 
right question: if we started from scratch with the problem of pro se litigants, what 
would we do? 
When that question is considered, the relatively modest nature of the 
reforms thus far is actually quite promising.  Many pro se assistance projects 
actually involve very little change in the courts or clerks offices themselves.  Instead 
they involve better preparing pro se litigants to appear by themselves in a 
traditional courtroom.246  Even the projects described above involve very, very 
incremental change: creating a special court for pro se litigants, allowing clerks to 
give limited advice or treating pro se litigants respectfully.  As such, a great deal of 
reform can be accomplished for relatively little expense: retraining all court 
personnel (and especially judges and clerks) to make special efforts to improve the 
experience of pro se litigants alone would make a very big difference.   
                                                        
245  See ZORZA, supra note __.  
246  See Stephan Lamdsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 
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The next level of reform is likewise relatively inexpensive, but it requires 
more thought and effort.  Court processes and forms should all be revamped to 
assist pro se litigants.  This requires the creation of form pleadings and greater 
transparency and clarity in court processes, so that pro se litigants can easily 
navigate the paperwork and court experience. 
There is even a further type of reform possible and here is where the real 
promise of pro se court reform lies.  If any thought or effort is put into combining 
technology with the needs of pro se courts and litigants something truly 
revolutionary might emerge.  Colin Rule, Director of online dispute resolution at 
eBay/PayPal, has written a book outlining the simple, but amazingly effective, eBay 
online dispute resolution system.247  A comparison between the online procedures 
versus what the typical pro se litigant faces in court is staggering.  If pro se courts 
could ever be convinced to let technology loose the results would be exceptional: a 
simple, transparent court system aimed at assisting litigants in a considerate and 
efficient manner.  Ask any poverty lawyer if any of those adjectives describe the 
courts where they practice and the answer will very likely be an emphatic no. 
Interestingly, that is where the pro se court innovation concept truly departs 
into science fiction: imagine a world where there are special courts that are set up 
for the poor that operate so well that they are the envy of the wealthy who are still 
using a lawyer-driven model that persists from seventeenth-century England.  The 
really crazy thing is that it is not only possible – if advocates for the poor could 
convince legislatures and courts that this approach would alleviate the pro se crisis, 
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make more use of precious judicial resources, save money and (as a bonus) produce 
better, fairer outcomes – it may be probable. 
CONCLUSION 
 Unfortunately that very possibility is exactly what may stand in the way.  
Lawyers and bar associations have powerful incentives to see pro se litigants flail in 
court.  First, it convinces anyone who can even marginally afford a lawyer to try to 
get one before coming to court.  Second, it makes civil Gideon look like a great 
solution – as per usual the solution to the struggle of the poor in America’s courts is 
more lawyers.  Lastly, it keeps the paying customers from drifting away on simple 
cases that they could possibly handle pro se like wills, divorces or bankruptcies.  If 
poor people could cheaply and easily get a divorce it could take quite a toll on the 
paid divorce practice in this country. 
 Nevertheless, the seeds have been sewn.  Unlike civil Gideon, which is an 
inherently conservative and backward-looking solution to a very real problem, pro 
se court reform has already begun and seems likely to accelerate.  Now is the time 
for poverty lawyers and other advocates to throw their weight behind these efforts 
to help change the lives of the poor.  Transforming the nature of American justice in 
the process is just the bonus package. 
